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EXPLAINING 
JUNKSPACE 
Architects between 
Market Ideology and 
Financialization 
The call for papers for this conference, drawing up a background of the Empire 
as a “headless power”, coupled with the conception of the end of ideologies, ne-
vertheless missed to ask questions on arguments and authorities that constitute 
decisions. Apparently, it was overlooked that in various sectors of society decisi-
ons are justified with financial criteria, which in turn go back to both constraints 
of the economic system and to the purposefully implanted ideology of the free 
market. Architects take this ideology for a natural order. Consequently, they 
respond with individual, little systemic strategies to the changing conditions of 
globalization. 
In view of the economic situation of architects these strategies can be regar-
ded as a failure. In my contribution I would like to give some examples for this, 
relating to Koolhaas. Furthermore, I will introduce more appropriate theories on 
the financial and economic development by sketching some points of theories on 
financialization. Finally I will present some hypotheses on the role of architects 
as intermediaries in the context of financialization, and especially deduct one 
model of architect which seems to play a central role in an advanced state of fi-
nancialization: the second-tier builder.
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Market ideology and market constraints in Koolhaas’ statements 
and his business strategy 
In his publications, Koolhaas and his partners often use keywords from the eco-
nomic context, such as the market, the New Economy, globalization, shopping, 
hedge funds, offshore centres, volatility, instability and capitalism. Quick readers, 
such as students, take these as purely descriptive. Upon closer inspection it be-
comes evident that terms from the economic field are often presented according 
to neo-liberal ideology. 
For example, this is the case in the publication Content, in which the Editor 
McGetrick praises volatility and the resulting instability as a source of freedom,1 
and in Koolhaas’ statements on hedge funds, the operation of which he verbally 
transfigures as “fast discovery and leverage of market irregularities with the aid 
of unconventional techniques and at a high risk”2. Despite the architect’s talka-
tiveness, no classification is given in the context of the national economy and 
society. It is similar with OMAs/AMOs reference to Offshore Centres in the booklet 
titled “The Gulf”. Here the authors describe Dubai’s tax exemption plan as a 
system of non-hierarchical cultural and social norms3. The authors seem to 
pick up the rhetoric of Offshore service providers and the hosting govern-
ments, which often refer to the international character of their location, 
while leaving out that instead of national there are economical barriers, 
and that, on top of this, immigrants from poor countries are discriminated 
on the labour market.4 
Following Koolhaas, for architects it is a question of flexibility to cope with the 
existing economic context. My former research shows how in fact OMA itself had 
to agree on a partnership with a big investor who forced the architects to scale 
down the creative aspects of their projects by minimizing the time spent on com-
petitions, by economizing working materials and by eliminating project budgets 
for design furniture5. Koolhaas managed to re-establish himself economically, but 
1 See Brendan McGetrick: “Content is a product of the moment.” In: AMO/OMA, Koolhaas et al, 
Content, Cologne: Taschen, 2004, p. 16.
2 OMA, Hedge-Fond [sic], in: archplus 175, December 2005, p. 90. 
3 OMA-AMO, The Gulf, 2007, p. XX.
4 It could be argued that even if Koolhaas and his team transmit ideological—roughly said 
neo-liberal—messages, this is meant ironically, provocative or a part of his business strategy 
for selling the label “Koolhaas”. Even if this should (partially) be true, this is not very relevant. 
The question is a) whether the assumptions on the relation of the economic context in relation to 
architecture work and b) how this approach might be used to develop a less ideological model to 
better predict the interactions of finance, economy and architecture.
5 Silke Ötsch: “The Emperor‘s new firm. Inside the global Y€$ and how to get out.” In: GAM 04, 
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in doing so he published less, and designed buildings which are often criticised 
because they are seen as immoral and overly deferential of the existing power 
structures, such as the television building for the Chinese government (CCTV) or 
the Gazprom tower in St. Petersburg. That means he made concessions, probably 
due to financial constraints. 
How to prevent an ideological view on architecture. 
An attempt to build architecture theory on more appropriate theo-
ries of the economic context—especially financialization
Although Koolhaas addressed crucial points—phenomena that influence the de-
velopment of the society and among this the situation of architects – the question 
is how to introduce concepts that deal with the economic context of architecture 
without taking up the cautiously implanted ideology of free markets. In the recent 
years there has been an increasing interest in the effects of finance, because it 
seems apparent that financial criteria are getting more important in different 
areas of the economy and society. I suggest to look closer at theories from the 
field of political and cultural economy, which try to understand better the impacts 
of the economic respectively financial system on real economy and society, es-
pecially theories of financialization. Financialization is used as a broad term 
because, as Gerald Epstein phrases it, “there is not even a common agreement 
about the definition of the term, and even less about its significance”6. It describes 
the era following fordism from the seventies onwards. In his book, editor Epstein 
distils two common convictions of his authors: the growing importance of finan-
cial phenomena and the view that “some of the effects of financialization […] 
have been highly detrimental to significant numbers of people around the globe”7. 
Most economists agree, that capitalism has undergone an important change in 
the seventies, due to liberalisation of the financial markets and/or the downturn 
of real economy. Following Crotty, from 1973 onwards firms were confronted with 
what he calls the ‘neoliberal paradox’: falling rates of GDP in comparison with 
the ‘Golden Age’, a decreasing demand, but higher interest rates and the demand 
for higher profits generated by the financial markets. The competition between 
Non Financial Companies (NFCs) became stronger, firms were managed more 
and more in accordance to financial market requirements8. Duménil and Lévy 
Wien: Springer, 2007, p. 118.
6 Gerald Epstein: Financialization and the world economy, Cheltenham UK: Elgar, 2005, p. 3.
7 Ibid., p. 5.
8 Crotty, J.: “The neoliberal paradox: the impact of destructive product market competition and 
‚modern‘ financial markets on nonfinancial corporation performance in the neoliberal era.” In: 
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argue that there is a new class alliance between upper salariat and the owners 
of capital at the expense of wage income which restructures economy by leading 
to lower wages, decreasing demand and an increasingly unjust division of wealth 
and income and a downturn of real economy in the long run9. One crucial term 
used here is “accumulation”, which means the tendency to a concentration of 
capital which is—following authors from political economy—inherent in finan-
cial capitalism respectively capitalism. Anyhow, research on listed companies has 
shown that a large majority of NFCs were unable to achieve earnings in excess of 
the cost of capital: “The small percentage whose earnings exceeded the 12 to 15 
percent cost of capital demanded by financial markets were concentrated in in-
dustries with oligopolistic structures and price-setting power”10. That would mean 
that the mechanisms described by authors from the field of political economy are 
probably not as strong as assumed. Froud et al. agree that financialization led to 
high inequalities and shifted the focus to the leading group of working rich in the 
1990s and the 2000s, which they call financial markets intermediaries11. 
Researchers from the field of cultural economy underline that financialization 
does not follow one specific logic, but different logics in different times and spac-
es. Economists and sociologists from this camp often refer to Bourdieu, and argue 
that people do not act as homo oeconomicus because they are situated in differ-
ent fields. In a study on the operation of the derivatives market at the stock ex-
change of Chicago, MacKenzie and Millo show that even stock dealers are guided 
by principles of loyalty towards the expectations of seniors, their patrons and by 
ambition. Beyond this they show how a mathematical model performs economy12. 
Following Callon, MacKenzie speaks of the ‘performativity of economics’. Refer-
ring to case studies on the German automotive and chemical industry, Kädtler 
concludes that there is a tension between financial markets and the real economy 
due to different time frames, but emphasizes that real economy is too complex to 
Epstein (ed.): Financialization and the World Economy, ibid., p. 78ff.
9 See Gérard Duménil, Dominique Lévy: “Costs and Benefits of Neoliberalism: A Class Analy-
sis.” In: Epstein (ed.): Financialization and the World Economy, ibid., 2005, p. 17 – 45.
10 Froud et al, 2000 quoted by Crotty in: ibid., 2005, p. 100.
11 Ismail Erturk, Julie Froud, Sukdev Johal, Adam Leaver, Karel Williams (eds.): Financializa-
tion At Work: Key Texs and Analysis, London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2008, p. 35. Also see: 
Peter Folkman, Julie Froud, Sukdev Johal, Karel Williams: “Working for themselves: capital 
market intermediaries and present day capitalism.” In: Business History, vol. 49, no. 4, 2007, 
pp. 552 – 572.
12 Donald MacKenzie, Yuval Millo: “Constructing a market, performing theory: the historical so-
ciology of a financial derivatives exchange.” In: American Journal of Sociology, vol. 109, 2003, 
pp. 107 – 45.
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simply apply abstract laws or the simple cause-effect relationships of financial 
markets. These must be merely understood as leading principles established by a 
public of investors, rating agencies, analysts and media. Thus, financialization 
is “a shift of criteria in accordance to what is seen as economically advantageous 
from the prevalent point of view”13.
Even though authors such as Martin emphasize the all-embracing character 
of financialization,14 most research concentrates on areas where the effects of 
financialization can be traced in a more direct way, such as listed companies, or 
addresses the topic from a broader, macro-economic perspective. The question 
is then, how this phenomenon affects areas of the economy, such as architecture, 
which are traditionally structured, produce long-lasting goods15 and consist of a 
large number of small and mid-size firms. In the recent phase of financialization, 
the group of intermediaries plays an important role. In this context “intermedia-
ries” refers to actors who provide architectural services in the real economy that 
match the profit expectations of the financial sector. Intermediaries are highly 
influential because of their position; a position which attributes authority derived 
from their connection to the financial markets to them and allows them to chan-
nel capital. It is evident that architects too act as intermediaries, but their role is 
unclear: they are at once winners, as their services are needed, and losers—due 
to tightened financial constraints. The ambiguity of the position is expressed in 
star architect Rem Koolhaas’ claim that architects have a lot of freedom within 
the existing economic context as long as they adapt.16
Hypotheses on intermediation in architecture
If one relates the question of intermediaries in the context of financialization to 
architecture it might be useful to start developing the hypotheses from a case 
which has clear characteristics of a financialized economy. Such a case is the re-
sort architecture of Las Vegas, because nearly all of the more than 50 resorts are 
13 Traduction of the author. In original: Finanzialisierung ist nicht die “Unterjochung der Vertre-
ter der Realökonomie durch die der Finanzmärkte“, sondern eine „Verschiebung der Gesichts-
punkte im Rahmen dessen, was nach herrschender Überzeugung als wirtschaftlich gilt“. Jürgen 
Kädtler: “Bruchstelle der Sozialpartnerschaft. Der Renditedruck schafft soziale Distanzen.” In: 
Mitbestimmung 10/2008.
14 See Randy Martin: Financialization of daily life, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
2002.
15 Margarete Czerny, Michael Weingärtler: “Volkswirtschaftliche Bedeutung der baukulturellen 
Qualifizierung”. In: ARGE Baukulturreport, Österreichischer Baukulturreport 2006, Baukultur: 
Wirtschaft, 2006, p. 6.
16 Rem Koolhaas: “On Content.” In: hunch, 2004, p. 124f.
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owned by listed corporations and are investment objects. Building on my previous 
research,17 three types of architecture can be identified in the area. 
The first type is the architecture of “copycats”18—this means an architecture 
planned by corporate design and planning departments. Architects play a margin-
al role, do not coordinate and lead the building process as traditionally expected, 
and do not even make important decisions on the design. The interdisciplinary 
planning team is copying architecture which has previously generated high prof-
its. This kind of architecture is the most common among Las Vegas’ casino hotels. 
The second type is the architecture of famous architects. Investors have been 
assigning internationally renowned stars as Koolhaas’ OMA, Morphosis, or 
Frank Israel to build casinos or part of the resorts. Most visitors did not appreci-
ate this kind of architecture because it was too academic. Star architects were 
not invited any more and their buildings were altered. 
The third type is architecture of the second-tier builder Jerde and the investor 
Wynn, described as ‘charismatic’. This kind of architecture has generated most 
profit. Resorts constructed in this way are economically most successful. The 
production costs are usually low, compared to the architecture of star architects, 
because the architecture is not really innovative but the architect adds something 
that is perceived as relating to high culture and thus appealing to visitors. 
Apart from this, there were only very few Architects with the traditional pro-
file of the profession (developing a building from design to construction, including 
supervision of the building process) working within this context.  
Beyond this, I assume that financialization at the same time leads to another 
tendency: disintermediation (this is what “copycats” are doing). It means that the 
investor directly deals with the producer. By avoiding competence and control of 
professionals as architects, the professional criteria are suppressed in favour of 
financial requirements, and the investor cuts costs for the intermediaries.19
17 See Silke Ötsch: Überwältigen und schmeicheln. Der menschliche Körper im Visier der 
Planer, Weimar, 2006. Also see: Karin Jaschke, Silke Ötsch (eds.): Stripping Las Vegas: A Con-
textual  Review of Casino Resort Architecture, Weimar, 2003.
18 See Hal Rothman: Neon Metropolis, London: Routledge, 2002.
19 The report on creative industries in Vienna showed that architecture is done by design-and-
build also because a package of services is provided which rationalizes the procedure. Demel, 
Falk, Harauer et al.: Untersuchung des ökonomischen Potenzials der “Creative Industries” 
in Wien, report edited by Mediacult Wifo Kulturdokumentation, Stadt Wien, Magistratsabteilung 
27 EU-Strategie und Wirtschaftsentwicklung, Wirtschaftskammer Wien, Filmfonds Wien, Wien, 
2004, p. 53. This observation is probably typical for architecture in the context of financialization.
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Starting from this example I suggest the hypothesis that star architects can 
as well act as intermediaries, because they provide buildings of cultural value, 
which may turn into financial value, but to a smaller degree than those designed 
by second-tier builders (see below). As the buildings of architects appreciated by 
critics and professionals are often pioneering, it is risky for investors to engage 
a star architect, because their buildings are not necessarily well received by the 
broad public, and because star architects might insist on innovative design which 
might increase building cost. As a consequence of this, buildings designed by star 
architects are often taken over for construction by other (cheaper) firms or (sub)
contractors, or star architects become second-tier builders by adapting to the 
exigencies of their clients.20
Intermediary services in architecture are provided by the second-tier 
builder. This notion refers to architects who are generally under-represented in 
professional publications, relative to the sheer amount of buildings produced by 
them. This is because the architecture is not appreciated as innovative or of high 
quality from the perspective of critics and colleagues. The second-tier builder 
does emphasize the architectural qualities of her/his buildings, and may even be 
perceived as a star architect by the public and the investors, but also provides an 
architecture that can be built efficiently. Examples of this kind of architect are the 
already mentioned Jon Jerde, the artist-architect Hundertwasser or the Austrian 
architect Kaufmann, who is economically very successful but largely unknown 
among architects21. The crucial point about the second tier architect is that this 
type of architect brings together the most lucrative strategies by combining the 
strategies of intermediation and disintermediation.
Even if it is difficult to criticise the text Junkspace because of its literary 
character, the question is whether Inaba and Koolhaas intuitively describe the 
architecture of second tier builders. It is an architecture which is typical for an 
advanced state of financialization, which is neither the cheap architecture of dis-
intermediation, nor everyday architecture, nor the architecture of star architects. 
It gives incentives for consumers to spend because it addresses an average taste 
by preventing being something special, whereas in fact it is built in a rationalistic 
way. Thus it is an architecture which generates the highest profits.
20 The architect Frank Gehry is an example for this. He was economically unsuccessful in his 
first phase when he was designing average shopping malls. In a second phase he built his own 
house and some small buildings which were innovative and appreciated by critics but were eco-
nomically not very profitable. As a consequence he was discovered by investors, became famous 
and economically successful by providing second-tier buildings.  
21 Wojciech Czaja: “Ich bin der Mann mit Hut.” In: Standard, 9.08.2008.
